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Abstract 
 
This paper uses timer series panel data from Bloomberg to ascertain the affects that carbon prices 
and other factors have on European oil and steel companies. This paper finds inconclusive 
evidence of carbon price return correlation with oil and steel company equity return. However it 
does find a strong positive correlation between the market portfolio excess return, which is the 
return on the DJS 600 EUR index minus the German three-month T-bill rate, and oil and steel 
excess equity return. 
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I. Introduction 
 The Mauna Loa Research Laboratory in Hawaii puts the current level of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) molecules in the air at three hundred and ninety-four parts per million (ppm)1.  These 
molecules contribute to the “greenhouse gas effect” whereby infrared radiation is trapped within 
earth’s atmosphere and returned to earth. The rise in carbon dioxide concentrations from two 
hundred and eighty ppm, pre-industrial times, to today’s levels can be attributed in part say 
reports from HM Treasury (2006d) to the burning of fossil fuels, deforestation, and other 
changes in land-use. Taking into account all the greenhouse gasses stipulated in the Kyoto 
Protocol (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulfur hexafluoride, hydro fluorocarbon, and 
perfluororocarbons) would put the figure closer to four hundred and thirty ppm of carbon 
dioxide. (HM Treasury, 2006d) The manifestation of these molecules in the air on the earth’s 
climate has been an increase in the global average near-surface temperature of 0.7 degrees 
Celsius2. While this doesn’t seem like much the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
concluded in 2001 that most of the increase in temperature over the past fifty years is caused by 
human activities3 an analysis that has been supported in the Joint Statement of Science 
Academies in 2005 and the US Climate Change Science Programme in 2006.  
The most severe impacts of this climate change are not the warming but its influence on 
rainfall patterns and extreme weather conditions. Projections are robust but the cost of extreme 
weather events such as storms, floods, droughts, and heat waves could reach 0.5 – 1% of world 
                                                          
1
 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Aministration, Recent Monthly CO2 at Mauna 
Loa, http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/#mlo.  
2
 Brohan (2006), pg. 21. 
3
 Folland, 2001. Pg. 59. 
 5 
 
GDP and could rapidly increase at higher temperatures. In contrast the cost of limiting GHG 
emissions could be limited to around 1% of global GDP each year4 (HM Treasury, 2006d). 
 Global climate change is unique in that it is a long lasting global problem that requires 
international and immediate action. Major international commitment to GHG emission policy 
can be traced back to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
an international environmental treaty developed in 1992 at the Earth Summit (U.N., 1992). The 
defining outcome of this treaty is the Kyoto Protocol which sets a legally binding GHG 
emissions target for thirty-seven industrialized countries and the European community. The goal 
is supposed to amount to a 5% reduction from 1990 levels on average over the period 2008-2012 
for Annex 1 member states (U.N., 1998). To meet their GHG emission reduction limits the 
Kyoto Protocol allows for mechanisms such as emissions trading, the clean development 
mechanisms (CDM), and joint implementation (JI). Examples of CDM reductions, given by 
World Bank (2010) are done through renewable energy, energy efficiency, and fuel switching. 
The goal as described by Grubb (2003), is to introduce “flexibility” into the Kyoto Protocol by 
allowing industrialized, or Annex 1, countries the opportunity to invest in global low cost 
emission reduction ideas. Joint implementation is where Annex 1 countries can invest in GHG 
reductions in other Annex 1 countries in return for Emission Reduction Units (ERUs which equal 
one ton of carbon dioxide emission) which can then be used towards their current domestic cap. 
Unlike CDM, JI’s are registered in countries that already have emission cap requirements. 
 Emissions trading is a market-based approach wherein the government creates scarcity of 
the carbon commodity by placing a cap on GHG emissions that may be polluted. Permits for the 
emission of one ton of carbon dioxide gas are given or auctioned off to emitters who can then use 
                                                          
4
 Stern remarks that this cost relates to keeping ppm’s below 550. 
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them in the course of business, sell them if they have excess, or buy more to cover excess 
emissions. In theory this will give low cost emitters an incentive to reduce emissions and sell 
surplus tradable credits to higher cost emitters. This also introduces economic incentive to use 
new reduction technology in order to capture the opportunity cost of retaining carbon permits. 
Society benefits when the true cost emitting pollutants into the air is placed on producers 
(Niblock, 2011).  
 The European Union Emission Trading Scheme was proposed in October 2001 to be the 
“flagship measure” under which the EU would meet its GHG emissions restrictions under the 
Kyoto Protocol (Ellerman and Joskow, 2008). The EU ETS was established as one of the first 
cap-and-trade public policy experiments to see if carbon emission abatement could be realized 
through a global carbon price. So far the scheme has been broken up into three phases. The first 
being 2005-2007, second 2008-2012, and the third phase is being 2013 onward. Ellerman and 
Joskow (2008, 7), posit that the first phase constituted a “trial” period wherein the primary goal 
was to “develop the infrastructure and to provide the experience that would enable the successful 
use of a cap-and-trade system to limit European GHG emissions during a second trading period.” 
An empirical analysis of the affects of the EU ETS on certain sectors such as oil, steel, and 
electricity not only helps to shed light on the current evolution on the EU’s rapidly growing 
carbon emissions trading scheme, which was estimated to have a worth around $30 billion in 
2007 and potentially growing to $1 trillion within a decade,5 but also serves as a measuring stick 
and guidebook to the U.S. and other nationalities trying to develop successful cap-and-trade 
systems of their own. 
                                                          
5
 Kanter, Carbon Trading: Where Greed is Green, 2007.  
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 In my research paper my aim is to expand upon the earlier work done by Mohamed 
Amine Boutaba in his paper Does Carbon Affect European Oil Companies’ Equity Values? In 
this paper he looks at the relationship between European Union carbon allowances (EUA) and 
the equity returns of certain European oil companies in the first phase of the EU ETS. He also 
looks at EUA price risk across three other sectors, cement, chemicals, and steel. Examining the 
impact of the EU ETS on certain European sectors is interesting in that it gives investors an idea 
as to whether or not they should hedge against rising carbon prices. Also it is interesting to note 
how the global financial crisis (GFC) has impacted the second phase of the EU ETS. Scott 
Niblock (2011, 119) posits that the “GFC and ensuing global recession may have had a 
dampening effect on carbon and international equity market investment,” among other 
implications. I am going to answer the question of EUA price risk on oil and steel sectors by 
running the same generalized least squared cross-sectional time series model used by Mr. 
Boutaba. However where his data encompasses the first phase of the EU ETS I am mainly 
looking at the second phase. 
II. Literature Review 
 To my knowledge no studies have addressed EUA price affects during the second phase 
of the ETS on the equity return of certain European oil companies or steel companies. Using 
empirical evidence Veith, Werner and Zimmermann (2009) show how returns in the power 
generation industry are positively correlated with rising prices for carbon emissions. Sijm, 
Neuhoff, and Chen (2006) examine the effect that the free allocation of carbon dioxide emission 
allowances on the power sector, finding that power companies realize substantial windfall profits 
by passing on the perceived cost of allowances to customers. Several studies address the ETS 
with regard to market efficiency, distributional effects of allocation, and environmental 
 8 
 
effectiveness.  Scott Niblock (2011) uses a three-way approach of examing investability, 
dynamic linkages, and Random Walk when questioning whether or not European carbon markets 
are weak-form efficient. He finds that the European carbon market is weak-form inefficient, by 
showing poor investability, minimal diversification benefits, and non-random walk behavior, 
thus “resulting in market failure and uncertain outcomes for the global economy and 
environmentin long-run. Based on this rationale, the use of market-based mechanism to address 
climate change must be question.”6 I hope to expand the current literature on green economics by 
examining implications of carbon price in the EU ETS specifically the second phase. 
 The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. Section three describes the theory and 
hypothesis behind the paper. Section four describes the data. Section five discusses the empirical 
findings. Section 6 concludes. 
III. Theory 
 The hypothesis I am testing is the extent that changes in EUA price have on equity 
returns of certain European oil and steel companies. The multifactor model used in the paper is 
the same as the one used in Boutaba (2009). The empirical model is a generalized least squared 
cross-sectional time series linear model that takes the form: 
,    	
	
,  

,  ,  ,  		,   
Where  is the constant term,  is the residual not explained by the five variables, , is the 
excess equity return on each company’s stock, 	
, is the return on the EUA price,  
, is the 
return on oil prices, , is the market portfolio excess return, , is the exchange rate return, 
                                                          
6
 Niblock, (2011). 176. 
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and 	, is the interest rate factor. A strong positive significance of the 	
, factor could 
indicate the affects of EUA price on the excess return of oil and steel companies. By separating 
the panel data into monthly and yearly sections I can also assess the impact of the global 
financial crisis on this relationship. My hypothesis is that we will see a similar relationship 
between EUA returns and oil/steel company returns that was found in the previous study by 
Boutaba (2009). 
 
IV. Data Description 
 In this paper I look at the link between EUA price and certain European oil and steel 
company equity returns. I aim to update Boutaba (2009) by examining data from the second 
phase of the EU ETS, specifically daily data spanning Feb. 27th, 2008 to Dec 31st 2011. The oil 
companies that make up panel data for this study are British Petroleim, Dragon Oil PLC, Ente 
Nazionale Idrocarburi, ERG SpA, Esso, Hellenic Petroleum, Lundin Petroleum, Statoil, Neste 
Oil, Osterreichischen Mineraloleverwaltung, Repsol YPF, Royal Deutsh Shell A, Motor Oil and 
Total. Compania I left out Espanola de Petroleo which was used in the initial study because they 
had been acquired by another company. A sample of companies is used because aggragete 
indeces might incorporate oil-related industries not operating in refining7, thus emitting GHG, 
also companies included in an aggregate index are restricted on the liquidity of their equities 
(Boyer and Filion 2007). The steel companies used are Arcelor Mittal, Outokumpu, Rautaruukki, 
Salzgitter, Saint Gobain, Tenaris, ThyssenKrupp and Voestalpine. Acerinox was not used 
because it was acquired by another company.  
                                                          
7
 Boutaba, 2009, 5. 
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 Of the variables used in the analysis , is each companies excess equity return defined 
as the return on each company stock minus the yield on the three-month German Treasury Bill. 
The German three-month Treasury Bill was used by the previous study as well. 	
, is the 
return on the EUA spot price on the Bluenext exchange. 
, is the return on oil prices using the 
Europe Brent spot price. , captures the market portfolio excess return defined as the return on 
the Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 600 index in excess of the three-month German Treasury Bills yield. 
, is the exchange rate return of the Euro over the USD. 	, , the interest rate variable 
represents the risk free rate and is defined as the return of the yield on the ten-year German 
government bond minus yield on the three-month German Treasury Bill. All the data in this 
study was sourced from Bloomberg. Table 1 and 2 explain descriptive statistics for oil and steel 
company data. Table 3 highlights correlation values between variables. Oil company stock 
returns are positively correlated with all the variables and EUA returns are negatively correlated 
with all other independent variables. 
As the reader can see from Figure 1 (Appendix), the EUA spot price declines from nearly 
thirty euros to under ten euros before it stabilizes as a result of the global financial crisis. 
Specifically the Committee on Climate Change, CCC (2009, 67) identified two causes to the 
decline in the second phase the reduced output in energy sectors led to less abatement required to 
meet cap by emitters as well as the market’s idea of fossil fuel requirements declined combined 
to reduce carbon prices. These forces were unseen by the European Comission, committee that 
divides up carbon allowances among nations, resulting in an oversaturation of carbon permits. 
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Grubb (2009) highlights that the only thing that sustains the current spot price is the ability to 
“bank” or store carbon allowances from the second to third phase.8 
 
V. Empirical Findings 
 By dividing the sample into sub-periods by month, Table 4.a., we can see the relationship 
EUA prices and equity prices change over time. The relationship varies over the course of the 
sample as the relationship as at least weakly correlated four times with a positive effect and at 
least weakly correlated four times with a negative effect. Overall the EUA factor is not 
significant for oil companies or steel companies, Table 4.b. and Table 5, so it does not seem like 
there is a strong relationship. The most significant indicator excess of equity return for these oil 
and steel companies is the market portfolio excess return. In the sub-period data this relationship 
is significantly positive three times while significantly negative one time. Overall market 
portfolio excess return has a positive effect on oil and steel company excess return suggesting 
that market portfolio changes are reflected in a similar fashion for these European oil and steel 
companies. 
  
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 “Banking” was an ability that firms could not do from the first to second period, contributing to the almost zero 
EUA price at the end of the first period. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 In summary my hypothesis that there would be a positive relationship between EUA 
returns and oil/steel equity returns did not hold up in my model or data. This could have been 
due to errors in the model or incalculable affects from the global financial crisis that occurred at 
the start of the second phase of the EU ETS. However I did find a strong correlation between the 
market portfolio excess returns, which is the return of the DJS 600 EUR minus the three-month 
German T-bill rate, and excess equity return of these oil and steel companies. 
 In terms of research limitations it would have been better to have a larger sampling pool. 
Intra-day data would have increased effectiveness of econometric analysis. There could’ve been 
benchmark errors with the DJS 600 EUR index that led to inaccurate model data. Also further 
research could’ve broken down companies in each sector based on size or whether or not they 
were a “growth” versus “value” equity. Also looking at diversification or hedging benefits 
gained from EUA futures could be a possible source of future research.  
 GHG abatement is critical to the future health of the world and subsequent generations of 
children. There is no “silver bullet” Niblock (2011) for preventing climate change and several 
market based mechanisms and policy alternatives (carbon tax, abatement purchasing, and other 
environmental legislation) should be considered collectively as “global citizens” if we are to take 
climate change seriously. 
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VIII. Appendix 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for oil companies 
 
,(%) 	
,(%) 
,(%) ,(%) ,(%) 	,(%) 
       mean -1.135 -0.076 0.045 -1.154 -0.005 -0.054 
sd 2.882 2.421 2.589 2.169 0.786 1.864 
skewness -0.308 -0.090 0.063 -0.632 0.159 -0.004 
kurtosis 7.564 5.009 5.692 4.447 3.984 4.519 
Notes: sample of daily returns from February 27th 2008 to December 31st 2011. The number of 
observations is 13370. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for steel companies 
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Fig. 1 EUA spot prices (2/27/2008-12/31/2011)
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mean -1.179 -0.076 0.045 -1.154 -0.005 -0.054 
sd 3.494 2.421 2.589 2.169 0.786 1.864 
skewness -0.196 -0.090 0.063 -0.632 0.159 -0.004 
kurtosis 6.307 5.009 5.692 4.447 3.984 4.519 
Notes: sample of daily returns from February 27th 2008 to December 31st 2011. The number of 
observations is 7640. 
 
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix 
 
, 	
, 
, , , 	, 
       , 1 
     
       	
, 0.0046 1 
    
 
(0.5921) 
     
       
, 0.0126 -0.0098 1 
   
 
(0.1444) (0.2588) 
    
       , 0.3147*** -0.0074 -0.0195** 1 
  
 
(0) (0.3919) (0.0242) 
   
       , 0.0146 -0.0161 0.1947*** -0.0075 1 
 
 
(0.0925) (0.0619) (0) (0.3851) 
  
       	, 0.0078 -0.0105 0.0486*** 0.0083 0.2625*** 1 
 
(0.3695) (0.2255) (0) (0.3385) (0) 
 Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. ***, ** indicate significance at 1%, 5% 
respectively. 
 
Table 4.a. Model results for sub-period oil company  
Sub-
period α Rco2,t Roil,t Rm,t Re,t Rtc,t Adj. R^2 
2008-03 -1.721*** 0.125 0.042 0.617*** 0.554** 0.193 0.291 
2008-04 -0.958 0.092 0.055 0.620*** 0.544** -0.269* 0.106 
2008-05 -2.073*** -0.129 0.094 0.378** 0.756** 0.051 -0.018 
2008-06 -4.171*** 0.088 0.034 0.100 0.039 .346** 0.001 
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2008-07 -3.310*** 0.010 0.067 .346*** -0.121 0.037 0.058 
2008-08 -4.545*** 0.012 0.030 -0.071 -0.362 0.124 -0.039 
2008-09 -4.103*** .390** -0.020 0.181 .-058 -0.259 0.004 
2008-10 -3.393*** -0.151 -0.206 0.108 1.350** -0.565 -0.001 
2008-11 -3.31*** 0.181 0.052 .293* -.660** -.737*** -0.015 
2008-12 -2.31*** .133* 0.061 -.402*** 0.315 .261** 0.005 
2009-01 -.761*** 0.053 0.010 0.166 0.036 .278*** 0.016 
2009-02 -1.18*** -0.053 0.052 0.111 0.045 0.071 -0.039 
2009-03 -0.318 -0.018 -0.013 0.144 0.154 0.047 -0.001 
2009-04 0.019 -0.074 -0.059 0.082 .607** 0.107 0.009 
2009-05 -.4* -0.006 0.002 -0.052 0.003 0.120 -0.033 
2009-06 -4.55*** -0.069 0.007 0.111 0.328 0.030 -0.037 
2009-07 -.293** -0.102 .189** 0.252 -0.268 -.358** -0.003 
2009-08 -0.146 -0.074 -0.049 -0.157 .495* -0.003 -0.013 
2009-09 -0.178 -0.069 0.026 -0.050 0.248 0.078 0.003 
2009-10 -0.182 -.081* 0.067 0.077 -0.291 0.138 -0.022 
2009-11 -.388*** 0.107 -0.025 0.007 0.046 .201* -0.028 
2009-12 -.317*** -0.012 .127* -0.161 0.144 0.068 -0.028 
2010-01 -.305*** -0.042 0.023 0.183 0.234 -0.051 0.000 
2010-02 -.349** 0.000 0.080 -0.052 -0.165 0.053 -0.043 
2010-03 0.009 0.030 0.057 -0.048 0.082 -0.057 -0.021 
2010-04 -0.227 -0.133 0.006 0.219 -0.220 0.205 0.006 
2010-05 -.646*** -0.040 0.014 0.122 0.225 -0.119 -0.026 
2010-06 -.230* -0.044 0.030 -0.180 0.101 -0.031 -0.009 
2010-07 0.036 -.12** 0.050 -0.164 -0.012 -0.145 0.031 
2010-08 -.323*** -0.066 0.072 0.207 -0.146 -0.090 -0.030 
2010-09 0.003 0.082 0.017 -0.090 -0.227 0.048 0.004 
2010-10 -0.147 0.051 -0.067 .304* 0.111 0.022 -0.033 
2010-11 -.331*** .119* 0.059 0.134 -0.080 -0.057 -0.003 
2010-12 -0.173 -0.011 -0.115 0.028 0.035 -0.067 0.007 
2011-01 0.033 -0.079 -0.068 0.022 0.044 -0.067 -0.011 
2011-02 -.292*** -.286** -0.026 0.129 .325* -0.127 0.017 
2011-03 -.517*** 0.104 0.094 -0.044 -0.056 -0.027 0.010 
2011-04 -.620*** -.152** 0.115 0.099 0.009 0.036 -0.016 
2011-05 -.686*** -0.053 -0.060 0.175 0.340 -0.116 -0.041 
2011-06 -1.083*** -0.058 0.032 -0.033 -0.030 0.018 -0.040 
2011-07 -1.24*** 0.036 0.037 -0.132 -0.174 0.132 0.002 
2011-08 -1.29*** 0.032 0.082 -0.073 -0.261 0.123 -0.021 
2011-09 -.493** .392*** 0.022 -0.159 -.941* .180* -0.005 
2011-10 0.074 0.016 -0.118 -0.202 0.295 0.065 -0.012 
2011-11 -0.135 0.027 0.122 0.037 -0.250 -0.017 -0.030 
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2011-12 -.315** 0.008 0.077 0.171 0.115 -0.021 -0.008 
 
 
 
Table 4.b. Model results for whole period oil companies 
Whole-
period α Rco2,t Roil,t Rm,t Re,t Rtc,t Adj. R^2 
 
-.652*** 0.009 0.018 .419*** 0.050 0.001 0.099 
Notes: Observations = 13370, Panels = 14, *, **, *** indicate significance levels at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively. 
Table 5. Model results for whole period steel companies 
Whole-period α Rco2,t Roil,t Rm,t Re,t Rtc,t Adj. R^2 
 
-.660*** 0.021 0.002 .447*** 0.129 0.004 0.077 
Notes: Observations = 7640, Panels = 8, *, **, *** indicate significance levels at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively. 
